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Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal




In the children's book by P.D. Eastman,
ARE You MY MOTHER? 1 a baby bird seeks its
mother. To recap the "plot": A mother bird is
sitting on an egg, when she decides that because
the egg will soon hatch, she should find some
food. As soon as she leaves, a baby bird hatches
from the egg. The baby bird's first words are
"Where is my mother?" Not seeing any likely
candidates, the baby bird decides to leave the
nest and look for her. Not knowing what she
looks like, he2 walks past her. He encounters a
series of animals-a kitten, a hen, a dog, and a
cow- asking each one "are you my mother?"
Each animal answers something like, "'I am not
your mother. I am a dog,' said the dog." The
baby bird then encounters a car, a boat, and a
plane, asking of each one whether each is the
baby bird's mother, and none of which reply.
The climax comes when the baby bird sees what
is pictured as an crane-like machine and asks
whether it is its mother. "Snort," replies the
machine, scooping up the baby bird in its shovel
*Professor of Law, City University of New York School of
Law. Portions of this Article are based upon a talk at
Rutgers Law School sponsored by the Women's Rights Law
Reporter on October 27, 1999 while V.C. v. M.J.B. was being
considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The author
wishes to express her appreciation to the editors and staff of
the Reporter, especially Jeanne LoCicero and Koli Mitra, to
CUNY Reference Librarian Julie Lim, to CUNY students
Donna Canfield and Pavita Krishnaswamy for their research
assistance, to the CUNY Professional Development
and finally placing the baby bird back in its
original nest. When the baby bird's mother re-
turns to the nest, she sees the hatched bird and
immediately asks "Do you know who I am?"
The baby bird answers, yes, exclaiming that she
is not a kitten, a hen, a dog, a cow, a boat, a
plane, or a snort, but "You are a bird, and you
are my mother." As readers of the book, we be-
lieve we can tell the difference between the
baby bird's mother and all others. Children
who read the book delight in the knowledge
that the kitten, the dog, or the "snort" could not
be the baby bird's mother because they are not
birds. They delight in it because it is the story of
how the baby bird learns what the children al-
ready know.
The judicial construction of motherhood is
likewise based upon a belief that a mother can
be found in a world of non-mothers, that a
mother bird can be recognized among the dogs
and snorts. Judicial knowledge, like the knowl-
edge of readers of the children's book, is prima-
rily based on biology.' Like the baby bird,
Committee for financial support for research assistance, and
to S.E. Valentine.
1. P.D. EASTMAN, ARE YOU MY MOTHER (1960).
2. The baby bird is gendered as male, a choice which could
well be the subject of feminist analysis itself.
3. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Propagate: An
Introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Child Cus-
tody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J.
143, 145-46 (1999).
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human babies must typically have some genetic
link to those who may qualify as their mothers.4
However, unlike the children's book, the judi-
cial declaration has real consequences upon the
lives of mothers and children, because the judi-
ciary possesses the power to create the reality it
believes it apprehends. In other words, a court's
declaration of whether a person is or is not a
mother will have the consequence of making
that person a mother or not a mother in a legal
sense. The courts can thus deny a person the
opportunity to be a mother. Excluded by law
from the child's life, such a person's role as
mother will gradually diminish, although per-
haps not in the memories of the individual con-
sidering herself to be a mother. 5
Judicial pronouncements regarding moth-
erhood concern lesbians when two lesbians be-
come mothers to a child. V.C. v. M.J.B., 6 re-
cently decided by the New Jersey Supreme
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Court and the focus of this Article, presents a
typical scenario. V.C. and M.J.B. were lovers.7
M.J.B. was inseminated and gave birth to
twins.' Until the twins were almost two years
old, both women acted as parents, although at
trial M.J.B. characterized V.C.'s role as "mere
helper and not a co-parent." 9 When M.J.B. ter-
minated the relationship with V.C., at first the
women pursued arrangements which involved
V.C. as a parent in the twin's lives.' ° Soon these
arrangements disintegrated and M.J.B. decided
that she wants her new lover - and not V.C. - to
be the children's other mother." As biological
and thus legal mother, M.J.B. exercised what
she apparently viewed as her right to deny V.C.
all visitation and cut off relations with her.12
V.C. decided to sue in the New Jersey courts.
At trial, the judge denied the request for joint
custody and terminated visitation.13 The appel-
late division rendered a decision reversing as to
4. See id. at 146-47 (discussing the special conditions re-
quired to establish legal parenthood absent a biological rela-
tionship).
5. In her compelling first person narrative about her expe-
rience of being the "other mother" excluded from her child's
life, Nancy Abrams writes:
Finally, I could accept, not only that I am a mother -
had always been a mother- but, more precisely, what
kind of mother I had been. Yes, Norma had been there
for Amelia for everyday. She made the hour-by-hour
sacrifices that are associated with the term, and by which
she could rightly say that she earned this title. [ ] I was a
mother on a different plane. My job had not been the
daily lunches and lessons, but a broad and amorphous
task of loving, of learning and teaching the lesson (if
only by my constant doubt and its constant defeat) of
the heart's strength and power.
NANCY ABRAMS, THE OTHER MOTHER: A LESBIAN'S FIGHT
FOR HER DAUGHTER, 268-69 (1999).
6. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
7. The New Jersey Supreme Court does not use this term,
but states that the women "are lesbians," characterizes them
as "dating" and then having a "relationship," id. at 542, and
that an expert "likened their relationship to a heterosexual
marriage." Id. at 544.
8. There is some controversy about whether V.C. and
M.J.B. "jointly" decided that M.J.B. be inseminated. Accord-
ing to the New Jersey Supreme Court, "V.C. claimed that the
parties jointly decided to have children" and "jointly
researched and decided which sperm donor to use," while
M.J.B. "acknowledged that she consulted V.C." but claimed
that "she individually made the final choice about which
sperm donor to use" and that V.C. was initially unaware of
M.J.B.'s visits to a doctor regarding the insemination. Id. at
542. The Court found that both women attended prenatal
and Lamaze classes. Id. at 542. The Court also found that:
V.C. took M.J.B. to the hospital and she was present in
the delivery room at the birth of the children. At the
hospital, the nurses and staff treated V.C. as if'she were
a mother. Immediately following the birth, the nurses
gave one child to M.J.B. to hold and the other to V.C.
and took pictures of the four of them together.
Id.
9. Id. at 543. At trial, the perhaps once-fluid decision-
making regarding the twins' day care and medical care be-
came subject to intense debate. The New Jersey Supreme
Court finds it pertinent to note that it was "clear that M.J.B.
brought V.C. to the [child care] center she selected prior to
making a final decision" and that "M.J.B. listed V.C. as the'other mother' on the children's pediatrician and day care re-
gistration forms" and gave V.C. "medical power of attorney
over the children." Id.
10. As related by the New Jersey Supreme Court, after
M.J.B. ended the relationship in August 1996:
[t]he parties then took turns living ... with the children
until November 1996. In December 1996, V.C. moved
out. M.J.B. permitted V.C. to visit with the children until
May 1997. During that time, V.C. spent approximately
every other weekend with the children, and contributed
money toward the household expenses. In May 1997,
M.J.B. went away on business and left the children with
V.C. for two weeks. However, later that month, M.J.B.
refused to continue V.C.'s visitation with the children,
and at some point, M.J.B. stopped accepting V.C.'s
money.
ld. at 544.
11. V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999), aff'd 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) ("M.J.B. said she,
the children and her new partner were a family now").
12. "M.J.B. asserted that she did not want to continue the
children's contact with V.C. because she believed that V.C.
was not properly caring for the children, and that the chil-
dren were suffering distress from continued contact with
V.C." V.C., 748 A.2d at 544.
.13. "The trial court denied V.C.'s applications for joint le-
gal custody and visitation because it concluded that she failed
to establish that the bonded relationship she enjoyed with the
children had risen to the level of psychological or de facto
parenthood." Id. at 545. The Appellate Division affirmed as
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the visitation and affirming as to the joint cus-
tody, with opinions written by each member of
the three judge panel. 4 On appeal, a unani-
mous New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. 5
New Jersey thus joins the growing number of
states 6 which have allowed a lesbian nonlegal
mother17 the ability to have visitation.
I. FORESTALLING LITIGATION
Before discussing the consequences of liti-
gation between two lesbians who agreed to par-
ent a child, it needs to be emphasized that no
judicial resolution of the conflict can be an opti-
mal one. The perhaps utopian notion that lesbi-
ans and gays should be able and willing to re-
solve conflicts without resort to an adversarial
and patriarchal legal system is one that contin-
ues to have resonance.18 This is not, however,
an argument that it is the responsibility of the
nonlegal mother to desist from resorting to the
courts. It is important to understand that the
legal mother's denial of her former partner's
status as a mother is also a resort to the law: the
legal mother relies upon her own legal rights as
she understands them.
Lesbian legal theory must continue to in-
terrogate whether legal constructions are serv-
ing lesbians, both as individuals and as insuring
a broader conception of lesbian survival. Once
it was possible to argue that a certain commu-
nity ethical standard could replace legal mecha-
nisms,19 but as lesbian identities have grown in-
creasingly diffuse, the cohesiveness necessary
for "community ethics" has become illusory.2"
Nevertheless, the idea of ethical behavior be-
tween lesbians must not be abandoned. Moreo-
ver, there is no established method of determin-
ing the degree to which lesbian ethics do
influence the decisions of the many lesbians
who do not resort to legal solutions to solve
conflicts surrounding a dissolution of a relation-
ship to which children have been born.
Furthermore, the notion that resorting to
the legal mechanisms and theories may not be
productive is not a specifically lesbian perspec-
tive. For example, the recently enunciated stan-
dards developed by a group of lesbian and gay
legal advocates and endorsed by major lesbian/
gay legal organizations include such norms as
being honest about the nature of the relation-
ships regardless of legal labels, treating litiga-
tion as a last resort, and keeping homophobic
law and sentiments off limits.2 The standards
proceed from certain premises such as the lack
of "divorce" proceedings for same-sex couples
and the lack of recognition for children living
with lesbian/gay adults.22 However, the princi-
ples could be pertinent even if the law were
to custody but reversed as to visitation, concluding that V.C.
had established a parental relationship. Id. at 545.
14. Id.
15. V.C., 748 A.2d at 539.
16. See infra II.B. and notes 77-91.
17. As I have previously written, I prefer the term "nonle-
gal" to nonbiological in this context, although "nonlegal"
may seem to foreclose the issue to be decided. See RUTHANN
ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 180 (1998) (Using"nonlegal" and "legal" stresses the social construction of the
category rather than naturalizing it through recourse to biol-
ogy).
18. See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of
Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 17,
37-39 (1999); Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Mar-
riage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-
Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1724-25 (1997).
19. See generally SARAH LUCIA HOAGLAND, LESBIAN
ETHICS (1990); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992).
20. See Shapiro, supra note 18, at 18 n.5 (1999) ("I recog-
nize that to speak of 'lesbian community' is problematic for a
number of reasons"). Accord Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Beyond the Rhetoric of "Dirty Laundry": Examining the
Value of Internal Criticism Within Progressive Social Move-
ments and Oppressed Communities, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
185 (1999) (arguing for the necessity of internal criticism
within oppressed communities); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men
and the Intra-community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 567 (1994-5) (discussing the disputed positions with
the "community" on same-sex marriage). But cf. Freshman,
supra note 18, at 1761-66 (arguing for a community-enhanc-
ing understanding of mediation which allows individuals to
resolve their disputes consistent with the values of some rele-
vant community, including the gay and lesbian community).
For a more general discussion of the notion of community
in legal theory, see Daniel Ortiz, Categorical Community, 51
STAN. L. REV. 769, 769 (1999) ("The communitarian alterna-
tive to atomistic individualism in legal theory reproduces the
very error it assails in liberal individualism"); Glen 0. Robin-
son, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269 (1997) (an interroga-
tion of the idea of community relative to the larger frame-
work of society).
21. Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Protecting
Families: Standards for Child Custody in Same-Sex Relation-
ships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 151, 152 (1999) [hereinafter
Custody Standards]. In addition to Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders, the other organizations endorsing the stan-
dards include Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
National Center for Lesbian Rights, American Civil Liberties
Union Lesbian and Gay Rights project, and Children of Les-
bians and Gays Everywhere. See id. at 163 (Appendix).
22. See id. at 153-55.
comprehensive and offered formal equality. In
his introduction to the standards, gay legal
scholar William Rubenstein provides an inter-
esting parallel from Jewish traditions regarding
the problematic ethical behavior of a Jewish at-
torney representing a Jewish plaintiff against a
Jewish defendant before secular courts.23 Ru-
benstein poses some of the questions which
arise from this example,24 but does not pursue
the ultimate question of assimilation, which the
analogy raises. A lesbian legal theoretical posi-
tion which advocated a position similar to the
Jewish tradition Rubenstein cites would, I be-
lieve, be quickly dismissed as "separatist."25
In addition to the application of ethical
principles, litigation may be forestalled by pre-
vious minimal involvement with the law. For
example, the gay and lesbian advocates' stan-
dards specifically suggest creating documents
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supporting the existence of family and taking
advantage of any available legal protections. z6
This strategy has the "secondary benefit" of be-
ing a process during which the parties can "un-
cover, and encourage resolution of, areas where
the understanding" is vague or contradictory. 7
From the perspective of lesbian legal theory,
this strategy has the advantage of protecting the
relationships from outside interference, al-
though it may also be used by the parties
against each other .28
With regard to children, the major protec-
tive device available is so called "second parent
adoption".2 9 Influentially advocated by Profes-
sor Nancy Polikoff in 1990, the process has
grown increasingly available in the last dec-
ade.3 ° Although it is still difficult to obtain in
the majority of jurisdictions,3 second parent
adoption has become popular where available
23. Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 147 (citing Sanford Levin-
son, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Con-
struction of a Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1577, 1603 (1993)).
24. Rubenstein asks whether "queer parenting" disputes
would be better settled in alternative dispute resolution fo-
rums, rather than in the courts:
If gay couples opt out of the traditional legal system, can
they ever educate the players in that system-who will,
inevitably handle cases involving their lives-about
them? But if they litigate these difficult disputes there,
do they not risk making bad law that 'reinforc[es] nar-
row legal versions of what counts as a family,' setting
back gay rights in other areas?
Id. at 147.
25. For a brief discussion of accusations of separatism ap-
plicable to lesbian legal theory, see ROBSON, SAPPHO, supra
note 17 at 85. For a more textured view of lesbian separatism
in legal theory contexts, see Margaret Davies, Lesbian Sepa-
ratism and Legal Positivism, 13 CAN. J. OF LAW & SOCIETY 1
(1998) (comparing legal positivism and lesbian separatism).
26. See Custody Standards, supra note 21, at 156.
27. See id.
28. See ROBSON, supra note 19, at 119-26 (distinguishing
between legal tools that would protect lesbians from nonles-
bians by altering the laws which would otherwise operate and
legal tools which alter relationships between lesbians). See
generally Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Les-
bians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 511 (1990).
29. Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Les-
bian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J.
459, 467, 522-27 (1990).
30. In an early second-parent adoption case, In re Adop-
tion of T. & M., Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598
(D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Aug. 30, 1991), a District of Co-
lumbia family court approved dual petitions for adoption.
One lesbian adopted her lover's biological child conceived
through artificial insemination, while the other lesbian
adopted her lover's previously adopted child. Id. Courts in
New York soon followed. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Evan,
583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 400 (N.Y. 1995). Other jurisdictions to approve a
second parent adoption in the early 1990's included New
Jersey; see In re Adoption of J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1993); Vermont; see B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993); Massachusetts; see Adoption
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993).
Second parent adoptions have also been successful in
Texas, Illinois, and Alaska, see Suzanne Bryant, Second Par-
ent Adoption: A Model Brief, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 233 n.a & 237 n.27 (1995). In California second parent
adoptions have become relatively routine. See Adoption Op-
tions for Same Sex-Couples: An Interview With California
Adoption Lawyer Emily Doskow, 20 FAM. ADvoc. 40 (1997)
(describing practice consisting of many second-parent adop-
tions).
31. Jurisdictions which have specifically rejected second
parent adoption include Colorado, see In re Adoption of
T.K.J. and K.T.K., 931 P.2d 488, 492-93 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996); Ohio, see In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 106,
107 (Ohio 1998); and Wisconsin, see In the Interest of Angel
Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Wis. 1994). In Connecticut,
the legislature repealed the state supreme court's decision re-
jecting second-parent adoption in In re Adoption of Baby Z.,
724 A.2d 1035, 1055-56 (Conn. 1999). See CT-LEGIS 00-228
(2000) (amending CT. STAT. § 45a-724 (3) by allowing a par-
ent to enter agreements regarding adoption if parental rights
of all other persons have been terminated).
Presently, Florida and Mississippi expressly proscribe
adoptions by lesbians and gays. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) ("no
person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that
person is a homosexual"); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000)
(amended to provide "adoption by couples of the same gen-
der is prohibited"). A similar New Hampshire statute, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1990) (providing that any person"not a homosexual" may adopt) (repealed 1999). In Utah the
prohibition is clear but not explicit. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
30-1(3)(b) (2000) ("a child may not be adopted by a person
who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid
and binding marriage under the laws of this state").
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because it allows the nonbiological mother to
become a legal parent without terminating the
biological mother's parental rights.3" Analo-
gized to step-parent adoption, it thus allows the
child to have more than one mother, each of
whom is a legal parent.33
In addition to lesbian theoretical critiques
of second-parent adoption,34 one increasingly
apparent drawback of second parent adoption
is that it requires the development of facts dem-
onstrating that the nonlegal mother is in fact
functioning as a parent and that the child has
bonded to her in this way. For example, in the
case of V.C. and M.J.B., soon after the twins
were born, the two women "talked about" a
second parent adoption but "were advised to
wait until the children were older."35 When the
twins were twenty-one months old, the women
consulted an attorney36 and M.J.B. paid a two
thousand dollar retainer, with the understand-
ing that they would begin to collect "letters
from family and friends indicating that the par-
ties and the twins functioned as a family., 37
These plans were never actually pursued and
within two months, M.J.B. terminated her rela-
tionship with V.C.38 Thus, even where second
parent adoption is available, as it was in New
Jersey,39 it may not be useful because of the on-
erous process involved.4 ° The more effective
course of action may be a device called a "pre-
birth decree" recently awarded in California,
which purports to adjudicate parenthood from
conception."
Importantly, neither second parent adop-
tion nor pre-birth decrees prevents litigation.
These devices merely render both mothers "le-
gal" mothers, in the same legal position.42 Thus,
under these approaches, custody and visitation
determinations for lesbian parents can be ren-
dered according to the same standards as other
parents, most commonly the widely discretion-
ary standard of "best interest of the child., 43
For general discussions of sexuality as a bar to adoption,
see Heather J. Langemak, The "Best Interest of the Child": Is
a Categorical Ban on Homosexual Adoption an Appropriate
Means to this End? 83 MARQ. L. REV. 825 (2000); Lydia A.
Nayo, In Nobody's Best Interests: a Consideration of Absolute
Bans on Sexual Minority Adoption from the Perspective of the
Unadopted Child, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 25 (1996-97).
32. See ROBSON, supra note 17, at 185; Mark Strasser,
Courts, Legislatures, and Second-parent Adoptions: on Judi-
cial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of
the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1020-22 (1999).
33. See Julia Frost Davies, Two Moms and a Baby: Protect-
ing the Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adop-
tions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1067-70 (1995). See gener-
ally Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for
Same-sex Couples in a Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1
(1999); Paula Ettlebrick, Who Is A Parent? The Need to De-
velop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family
Ties: a Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-parent Adop-
tions, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 255 (1998); Timothy
E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examin-
ing the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 739 (1999); Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent
Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175 (1995); Carmel B. Sella, When a
Mother is a Legal Stranger to her Child: The Law's Challenge
to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.
J. 135 (1991).
34. See e.g., ROBSON, supra note 17, at 185-88. See gener-
ally, Erin J. Law, Taking a Critical Look at Second Parent
Adoption, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 699 (1998); Shapiro, supra
note 18.
35. V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) affd 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
36. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542-44 (N.J. 2000).
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id.
39. See In re Adoption of Two Children, 666 A.2d 535,
538-39 (N.J. 1995); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632
A.2d 550, 552 (COURT 1993) (granting second parent adop-
tion).
40. See Law, supra note 34, at 707.
41. See Carol Ness, Lesbian Moms Gain Rights, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, May 2, 1999, at A-i; Paul O'Donnell
et. al., Why Max Has Two Mommies, NEWSWEEK, May 17,
1999, at 6.
42. See Shapiro, supra note 18, at .37-40. But- see
LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (recognizing that a petition for joint adoption by the
biological mother and a nonbiological mother, but then ana-
lyzing the claim for custody by nonbiological mother as that
of "non-parent").
43. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (de-
nying veto authority of an adoption on ground that legitima-
tion was not in the best interest of the child); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (reversed'an award of custody
which was premised on racial prejudice and not in the best
interest of the child); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979) (affirming state deference to parental control over
their children yet recognizing that children who are mature
and capable of making decisions in their own best interest
should be allowed). See also Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (5) (1989-
90). For critiques of the best interest standard, see Lynn
Akre, Struggling with Indeterminacy: a Call for Interdiscipli-
nary Collaboration in Redefining the "Best Interest of the
Child" Standard, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 628 (1992); Robert Pfen-
ning, The Best Interests of the Child: Do the Courts' Subjec-
tive Factors in Determining "Best Interests" Really Benefit the
Child?, 17 J. Juv. L. 1,17 (1996); Janet Weinstein, And Never
the Twain Shall Meet: the Best Interests of Children and the
Adversary System; 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997).
II. ADJUDICATING PARENTHOOD:
A. Survey 'of Available Theories
Where there are not two legal parents, the
legal struggle by the nonlegal parent is to con-
vince the court to treat her as a legal parent and
apply the best interest of the child standard.
One possible strategy is to prove that the legal
parent is unfit and thus "demote" the legal par-
ent's status.4 4 Obviously, this would not be an
appropriate strategy for a lesbian nonlegal par-
ent who seeks custody or visitation with her
children without divesting the other parent of
her rights. Rather, she must attempt either to
elevate her own status to that of a legal parent
using statutory, constitutional, or contract theo-
ries or to prove de facto parent status based on
equitable theories.45
The problem of defining "parenthood" is
two-fold. Even before a nonlegal parent seeking
custody or visitation is heard on the merits of
her claim, the lack of parent status serves to
prevent her from asserting the claim, because
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she is considered to lack standing.46 The statu-
tory schemes generally define "parenthood" by
a combination of biology and the legal relation-
ship between the putative parent and at least
one biological parent.47 This formulation of
parenthood has its roots in common law,
wherein legal parenthood was vested in a bio-
logical mother and the man married to the bio-
logical mother. 48 The modern concept of
parenthood generally includes biological fa-
thers, 49 although many statutes continue to pro-
vide a presumption of paternity in the man mar-
ried to the biological mother.5" Some legislators
have sought to further modernize the statutory
scheme, especially with regard to expanding eli-
gibility for visitation rights.51 This innovation
has recently been before the United States Su-
preme Court, which declared in Troxel v. Gran-
ville that the application of such a statute could
violate a parent's due process rights to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and con-
trol of her children. 52
44. For example, in an unreported case, In re Matter of
T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. May 7, 1996),
the nonlegal mother alleged that the legal mother was "not a
fit and proper person to raise the minor child and that the
best interests of the minor child will be served in the primary
custody" of nonlegal mother. Id. at 1. The court did not find
the legal mother unfit, but did award visitation to nonlegal
mother using the "equitable parent" doctrine. The court also
ruled that "during each parent's periods of physical custody,
no unrelated person of the same or opposite sex over the age
of 12 shall be permitted to spend the night, whether or not in
a separate bedroom." Id. at 7.
45. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28
(N.Y. 1991); See also Elizabeth A. Delaney, Statutory Pro-
tection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Rela-
tionship Between the Nonbiologiocal Lesbian Parent and Her
Child, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 177, 180 (1991).
47. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43. (West 1993) (pro-
viding that a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he
is 'married to the mother and the child is born during the
marriage or 300 days thereafter). The presumption of father-
hood through marriage to the mother was held constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Step parents may also become par-
ents through statutory channels. See Davies, supra note 33, at
1067.
48. Mary Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and
Sex-Equality: Gender Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patri-
archy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 67-69 (1995). Interestingly, al-
though "a man's legal relationship to his offspring was deter-
mined by his relationship to their mother", id. at 68, where
such legal relationship existed, he, rather than the children's
mother had absolute custodial authority over them. Id.
The common law, which largely regulated legal aspects
of family relationships well into the nineteenth century,
was profoundly patriarchal.... Under th'e common law,
a man had complete custodial authority over all children
born to his wife, and no legal relationship at all to chil-
dren he sired out of wedlock .... a man's legal relation-
ship to his offspring was determined by his relationship
to their mother. If the mother was his wife, a child was
"his," so much so that he exercised exclusive custodial
authority. If the mother was not his wife, however, the
child was "filius nullius," the child of no one.
Id. at 68.
49. See id. at 77.
The determination of biological paternity becomes vitally
important when the mother is unwed and may effect adop-
tion. See id. at 75. See also Laurence Nolan, "Unwed Chil-
dren" and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme
Court From Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999).
Part of the emphasis on biological paternity has stemmed
from child support and welfare policy. See Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 333 (re-
quiring a woman seeking benefits on behalf of her child to
appear at interviews, hearings, and legal proceedings and
submit to genetic tests in efforts to determine paternity
before allowing benefits); David Chambers, Fathers, The Wel-
fare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child Support En-
forcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575 (1995); Kindra Gromelski,
You Made Your Bed... Now You Are Going to Pay for it: An
Analysis of the Effects of Virginia's Mandatory Parental Iden-
tification in AFDC Cases Will Have on the Rights of Unwed
Fathers, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383 (1999); Tonya
Plank, Human Rights, Women's Rights and Welfare Reform:
An Analysis of H.R.4 from an International Human Rights
Perspective, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 345 (1996).
50. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43 (West 1993).
51. WASH. REV. CODE §26.10.160(3) (1997).
52. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2065 (2000).
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The Washington state statute at issue in
Troxel allowed "any person" to petition for visi-
tation at "any time" and the court to grant such
visitation if it served the best interest of the
child.53 The Washington Supreme Court had
previously found the statute an unconstitutional
interference with the parents' familial rights be-
cause the statute did not require a showing of
harm to the child if visitation denied.54 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court de-
scribed the statute as "breathtakingly broad, 55
the Court did not declare the statute facially un-
constitutional and specifically did not consider
the question of whether such a statute must in-
clude a showing of harm to the child.56 The
Court stated that it did not and "need not de-
fine today the precise scope of the parental due
process right in the visitation context."57 The
court stated that the "problem" was not that the
state court intervened in the visitation dispute,
but "that when it did so, it gave no special
weight at all to [the legal parent's] determina-
tion of her daughters' best interests., 58
While Troxel itself concerned a grandpar-
ent's claim for visitation,59 a claim now allowed
by statute in all states,6 ° the rationale in the
case is relevant in the context of visitation gen-
erally, and may be useful for nonlegal mothers
seeking visitation. After Troxel, even if a statute
is broad enough to include a lesbian nonlegal
parent as a party who may petition for visita-
tion, the application of the statute would re-
quire giving "special weight" to the legal par-
ent's decision to deny visitation.61 After Troxel
any statutory claim by the nonlegal parent will
trigger a constitutional consideration of the le-
gal parent's Due Process interests.
On the other hand, Constitutional theories
can provide independent arguments for al-
lowing visitation to the nonlegal parent. One
source of Constitutional protection is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The basis of the Equal Protection argu-
ment is that the common law and statutory
schemes discriminate against non-birth parents
who are lesbian women by denying them legal-
parent status while awarding such status to non-
birth parents who are male and are married to
the birth-parents. 62 A somewhat different Equal
Protection argument can be made by compari-
son between lesbian nonlegal parents and
heterosexuals who have been deemed equitable
or de facto parents under state law.63 New
Jersey courts have recognized a de facto, par-
ent-like relationship (eventually termed "psy-
chological" parenthood).64 This equitable stan-
dard has been used to award custody to a child's
former stepmother 65 and to allow a child's
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (3).
54. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1999). The
court held that "short of preventing harm to the child, the
standard of 'best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve
as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's funda-
mental rights." Id. While recognizing that "in certain circum-
stances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship
with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the child of the rela-
tionship could cause severe psychological damage to the
child" but that the difficulty with the Washington statute is
that it did not require any such showing and therefore was
facially invalid. Id.
55. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061.
56. Id. at 2064.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2062.
59. The Troxels were the paternal grandparents of the two
children subject to the original visitation petition and subse-
quent litigation. Their son's relationship with Granville, the
children's mother, dissolved in 1991 and their son later com-
mitted suicide. After a period of visitation, Granville sought
to limit the Troxel's visitation to one day per month. Id. at
2057.
60. Id. at 2064 n.1 (citing 50 state statutes).
61. See id. at 2062.
62. For example, the New Jersey statute presumes a man
to be the father of a child if he is married to the mother and
the child is born during the marriage or 300 days thereafter.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43 (a)(2) (West 1993). Given this stat-
ute, V.C. might argue that if same-sex marriages were legally
available, the commitment ceremony between her and M.J.B.
would have accorded V.C. the presumption of legal
parenthood.
63. See Watkins v. Nelson, 729 A.2d 484, 492 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1999), rev'd and remanded on other grounds 748
A.2d 558 (N.J. 2000) (recognizing that there can be a "psy-
chological parent-child relationship between a child and
someone other than the child's biological parent") (internal
quotations and citation omitted). On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found that psychological parenthood was not
established by the facts in this case, 748 A.2d at 569-70, but
reaffirmed the idea that "when a third party, such as a step-
parent, establishes psychological parentage with the child,
the third party stands in the shoes of a natural parent" and
can claim custody based on "the child's best interest test"
without showing that the biological parent is unfit. See id. at
568-69. That is, the "psychological parent" and the biological
parent would be treated as two fit parents, triggering the"child's best interest test" for determining custody. See id.
64. See Watkins, 748 A.2d at 569.
65. See Palermo v. Palermo, 397 A.2d 349, 350 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). After the child's biological
mother died, the child lived with her biological father and his
new wife. Id at 349. When the father and stepmother sepa-
rated, custody of the child was awarded to the stepmother
grandparents to assert a custody claim on equal
footing with the child's biological parent (by not
requiring the grandparents to prove that parent
was unfit).66 Using such precedents, a petitioner
such as V.C. could argue that failure to consider
her claim as a "psychological parent" is attribu-
table only to her sexuality.67
Another Constitutional argument is based
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A doctrine of "fundamental
rights", often labeled "substantive due process"
by its critics, recognizes the Due Process Clause
as encompassing a number of fundamental
rights, including parental rights.68 However,
before parental Due Process rights may be as-
serted with any success, it is necessary to estab-
lish legal parenthood, which is precisely the dis-
puted issue in most lesbian co-parent actions.69
A third approach used in lesbian co-parent
litigation are equitable theories specifically ad-
dress the practical question of how to treat
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those who essentially function "parents", al-
though they lack the formal legal status of par-
ents.7 ° Such theories draw on family law and
chancery court sources rather than the common
law and avoid the formalism of the law and seek
functional definitions and applications.7' Under
this approach, the nonlegal parent may become
a parent by estoppel, or more precisely, the le-
gal parent becomes estopped from denying cer-
tain parental rights to the legal parent.72
There is perhaps a remedy in contract for
nonlegal parents who enter agreements with le-
gal parents to share the rights and obligations of
parenthood. However this is unlikely, because
courts tend to favor the "best interest of the
child" standard,73 and, like society generally,
courts disapprove strongly of children being the
subject of contracts (although the issue has
been raised primarily in surrogacy and stranger-
adoption contexts, rather than by co-parents).,4
Nevertheless, a court may consider the agree-
ment as relevant, especially as evidence that the
and the stepmother's new husband. Id at 350. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 352.
66. See Todd v. Sheridan, 633 A.2d 1009, 1015 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1993). The New Jersey Appellate Division re-
versed the Chancery Division's award of custody to biologi-
cal father over grandparents. Id at 1017. The reversal was
based on separate evidentiary grounds to be reconsidered on
remand. Id. However, it is significant that the Appellate Di-
vision agreed that the grandparents stood in parity with the
father, although it did allow Chancery to consider the fa-
ther's status as "natural parent". Id. at 1015.
67. While sexual orientation is not generally considered a"suspect classification" for the purposes of Equal Protection
scrutiny; see Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orien-
tation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1309 (1985); the United States Supreme Court
has occasionally held that classification by sexual orientation
failed to meet even the considerably lower Constitutional
standard of "rational basis". See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632-35 (1996) (holding that a statute expressly prohibit-
ing claims of discrimination based of sexual orientation does
not pass the "legitimate government interest" portion of the
rational basis test) (citations omitted).
68. See Troxel v.GranVille, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059-60 (1999)
(articulating visitation rights based on the doctrinal tradition
of reading the Due Process Clause to encompass various
unenumerated, "fundamental" rights). The Court relied on
more than seventy-five years of Due Process jurisprudence.
See id. at 2060 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.205
(1972); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)).
However, the Due Process doctrine of fundamental rights
is certainly not universally accepted. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at
2067 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that he concurs in' the
judgment with the understanding that the ruling was not an
endorsement of the discredited "substantive due process"
doctrine). Justice Souter gives a similar warning. See id. at
2065 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Powell's admo-
nition against "turning any fresh furrows in the 'treacherous
field' of substantive due process." Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
69. The possibility that the child may have constitutional
arguments in this context has not been fully explored. As the
Court noted in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court has "never
had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial
relationship." 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989). For an excellent gen-
eral discussion, see Gilbert Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The
Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships
with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994).
70. For example, in Alison D. v. Virginia M., the court
stated that Alison D. claimed "to have acted as a "de facto"
parent or that she should be viewed as a parent "by estop-
pel."" 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Palermo, 397 A.2d at 352, (affirming a family
court decision to award custody to a stepparent over the ob-
jection of the biological parent); Watkins v. Nelson, 729 A.2d
484, 485 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999), rev'd, 748 A.2d 558
(N.J. 2000) (stating that the trial court recognized grandpar-
ents who cared for the child as the child's "psychological par-
ents").
72. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d. at 29 (the petitioner claimed
that her child's legal mother be estopped from denying her
parental rights).
73. See generally Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 634 .(1979).
74. Cf. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (re-
fusal to enforce surrogacy contract). See also Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1926-
28 (1987); Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property,
The Alchemy of Race and Rights 216-36 (1991).
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legal parent agreed to the role of the nonlegal
parent as a psychological, de facto, or equitable
parent.75 Such contractual agreements are dis-
tinct from settlement agreements formed in the
course of litigation, which courts generally will
enforce, assuming such agreements are in "the
best interest of the child.",76
B. State of the Law
visitation or custody and the issue is attracting
widespread attention.77 A growing minority of
these have allowed visitation claims. These
states include Wisconsin,78 Pennsylvania,79 Con-
necticut,80 New Mexico,81 Massachusetts,82 Ma-
ryland,83 Minnesota,' and the New Jersey.85
There are also a few unreported trial court
opinions on nonlegal parent claims, including
More than a dozen states have considered
the issue of nonlegal lesbian parental claims for
75. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 888-89
(Mass. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 500 (1999). See also
Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 422, 433-34 (Wisc. 1995)
(this case is alternatively called Holtzman v. Knott or In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K. This article will refer to it as Holzman
or Holtzman v. Knott).
In E.N.O. as well as in Holtzman, the court considers the
agreement as part of the determination of whether the cir-
cumstances of parenthood existed.
76. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 160 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000), the court rejected the legal parent's appellate ar-
gument that she was coerced into agreeing to joint legal cus-
tody with her former partner and affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that joint custody was in the child's best interest.
77. See, e.g., Nicole Berner, Intent-Based Parenthood Held
Inapplicable in Case of Lesbian Mothers, 9 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L. J. 213 (1994) (discussing Georgia P., an unreported
California case refusing to enforce parenting agreement);
Delaney, supra note 46, at 180 (criticizing California cases
that denied lesbian nonlegal parents standing to sue); Paula
Ettlebrick, Who Is A Parent? The Need to Develop a Lesbian
Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513
(1993) (discussing nonlegal parents).
See also Denise Glasser Molloy, Another Mother? The
Courts' Denial of Legal Status to the Non-Biological Parent
upon Dissolution of Lesbian Families, 31 U. LouISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 981 (1992) (focusing on recent developments regard-
ing custody and visitation in lesbian family context); Nancy
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459 (1990)
(seminal article analyzing legal problems and proferring solu-
tions). See also Carmel Sella, When A Mother is a Legal
Stranger to her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian
Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135 (1991).
For a discussion of same-sex co-parent cases in the context
of broader principles, see John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties:
A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH.
& LEE. L. REV. 351 (1998) (considering same-sex co-parent
cases as well as step-, foster-, and grand-parents); Robin
Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising
from Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.5th 1 (2000) (the case
V.C. v. M.J.B is included in the volume).
78. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 434.
79. T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 881-82 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1316 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996).
80. Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840,
843-44 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Antonucci v. Cameron, 1999
Conn. Super., Lexis 2574.
81. Barnae v. Barnae, 943 P.2d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
82. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 828 (Mass. 1999)
(equity courts may award visitation to a "biological stranger"
if it deems this to be in the "best interest" of the child).
83. Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.,
2000). This was the first court to consider the effect, if any, of
Troxel, 120 S.Ct., 2054 (2000), on the issue of a nonlegal les-
bian mother's visitation. See id. at 1101. The Maryland
court's main concern was resolving issues under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Gestl, 754 A.2d at 1100-01.
As a part of that resolution the Gestl court concluded that
"Maryland accords standing to the group of persons who can
establish exceptional circumstances which relate to the
child's best interests". Id.
In another recent case, S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15 (Md.
Ct. App. 2000), the Maryland appellate court specifically
adopted the test set forth in Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d 419. For a
description of the test, see infra note 100 and accompanying
text. The Court relied on V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (2000)
for additional support. See S.F., 751 A.2d at 15.
84. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); but cf. Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991). In LaChapelle, the court held that the nonlegal
mother (who had nonetheless previously adopted the child)
had standing to seek custody and awarded the legal mother
and the nonlegal mother joint legal custody and further pro-
vided that the sperm donor have the "right to participate in
important decisions" affecting the child.
The decision in LaChapelle is a departure from the deci-
sion in Kulla rendered nine years earlier (and not cited by the
court in LaChapelle). In Kulla, a referee had found that Kulla
established a prima facie case under the Minnesota third
party custody statute, but a court concluded otherwise and
dismissed Kulla's petition for visitation with the child. Kulla,
472 N.W.2d. at 177. The child had been born to McNulty
while she was in a lesbian relationship with Kulla, who be-
came the child's care giver, at least while McNulty was "away
from home working as an airline attendant." Id. McNulty
subsequently resumed a relationship with the child's biologi-
cal father and later married him. Id. at 178. She specifically
disavowed any implication that her relationship with Kulla
was serious. Id.
The court upheld the trial court's finding that the peti-
tioner failed to satisfy one of the three prongs of the Minne-
sota third party visitation statute. The requires a court to
find: (1) that visitation is in the best interests of the child; (2)
that the petitioner and the child had established emotional
parent-child ties; and that (3) the visitation would not inter-
fere with the custodial relationship between the parent and
the child. MINN.STAT. § 257.022(2) (b). Here, the third factor,
which is subject to the discretion of the trial court, was found
to be unsatisfied. Kulla, 472 N.W.2d at 181. Kulla argued that
the third prong,is essentially impossible to prove without co-
two that have awarded joint custody to the les-
bian nonlegal parent.86
On the other hand, courts in New York,
Tennessee, California, Illinois, Florida, and
Ohio have rejected visitation claims by lesbian
nonlegal parents and have not recognized any
claim of de facto, psychological, or equitable
parenthood. 87 In Titchenal v. Dexter the Ver-
mont Supreme Court had held against allowing
nonlegal parental rights,88 but two years later
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declared that denying same-gender marriage
rights denied them homosexuals the "common
benefits" under the Vermont Constitution,89
which had the curious impact of effectively re-
pealing Titchenal.9" In many jurisdictions, the
law remains unclear. 9'
In this discussion, two opposite approaches
to deciding nonlegal parent claims will be re-
ferred to as "formalist" and "functionalist" per-
spectives.92 The formalist viewpoint is exempli-
operation from the biological parent. Id. The court found this
complaint unproblematic, because, the court noted, that
without the statute a petitioner such as Kulla would have had
absolutely no standing. Id.
85. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
86. See In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521 (Mo.
Cir. May 7, 1996) (while awarding "legal custody" and "pri-
mary physical custody" to legal mother, court ordered both
women to confer and discuss decisions affecting health, edu-
cation, welfare, extra-school activities, to inform each other
of activities, addresses, and medical conditions, to equally
share medical expenses and for nonlegal mother to insure
child, and imposed a visitation schedule of alternate weeks
with holidays rotating in alternate years); Julie Brienza, Les-
bian Partner Awarded Joint Custody of Child Following
Couple's Breakup, 35(Jan) TRIAL 98 (1999).
87. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d. 27, 29 (N.Y.
1991). Accord Lynda A. H. v. Diane T. 0., 243 A.D.2d 24,
(N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1998). However, there is some in-
dication that lower courts do not consider Alison D. as creat-
ing an across-the-board rule. A recent decision interpreted
Alison D. as leaving intact older authority, which have held
that a legal parent is equitably estopped from denying some
parental rights to certain parties. See In Re J.C. v. C.T., 711
N.Y.S. 2d 295, 297 (Fam. Ct. 2000). Such parties are those
who meet the criteria outlined in Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at
421, 435-6, and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 45.
See also In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (App. 3d Dist.
1990); In re Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48
(App. 1st Dist. 1999); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr.
212 (App. 1st Dist. 1991); West v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 160 (App. 3d. Dist. 1997). But see In re Hirenia C.,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (App. 1st Dist. 1993) (allowing a lesbian
co-parent to seek visitation under the doctrine of equitable
parenthood in a dependency hearing involving a child who
the former partners had attempted to adopt). In re C.B.L.,
723 N.E.2d 316, 320 (II1. App. Ct. 1999) (legal parent's for-
mer same sex partner lacked standing to sue for visitation
with child); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999) (a parent's fundamental right
of privacy barred alleged "psychological parent" from bring-
ing visitation action, absent a showing of harm to the child);
Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1234-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (former lesbian partner of the child's biological
mother failed to state a cause of action when she sought
shared responsibility and visitation with child that was born
to the defendant by artificial insemination during domestic
partnership with petitioner); Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-
137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (the parties had
been domestic partners for six years and jointly decided to
"bring a child into their relationship," with Appellee acting
as the birth mother. After they separated, Appellant, who
had been the child's primary caretaker, sought visitation and
child support. The court found that she was "not a parent"
and thus lacked standing.")
88. Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997).
89. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878-79 (Vt. 1999).
90. The ruling in the Titchenal case led Vermont Legisla-
ture to enact a "civil unions" statute that includes the follow-
ing provision:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a
child of whom either becomes the natural parent during
the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of
a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either
spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §1204 (f) (1999).
91. For example, in Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
1998), the Texas Supreme Court denied visitation rights to a
lesbian nonlegal parent by construing the relevant statute to
bar petitions that are not filed within six months of the peti-
tioner's loss of "care, custody, and possession of the child."
Id. at. 431. The text of the statute requires petitioner to have
had "care, custody, and possession of the child for not less
than six months preceding the filing" but does not contain
the word "immediately". TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9)
(Vernon 2000).
In the unique circumstance of a custody battle between the
nonlegal mother and a biological/legal father (upon the death
of the legal mother), courts have generally made their deci-
sions based on fact-centered analyses. In Michigan, a nonle-
gal mother was found to be without standing, although she
had lived with the children for eight years, was the subject of
a power of attorney executed by the legal mother regarding
the children, and had been named in the legal mother's will
as the children's guardian. See McGuffin v. Overton, 542
N.W.2d 288, 292 (Mich. App. 1995). But see In Re Guardi-
anship of Astonn H., 635 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Fam. Ct. 1995) (upon
the death of the legal mother, the family court awarded cus-
tody to nonlegal mother over the legal mother's estranged
husband, who was the legal (but non-biological) father of the
child. The court considered the nonlegal mother's "stable,
loving presence" in the child's life as part of a "best interests"
analysis). Of course, the applicability of Astonn H., beyond
its particular facts is limited by Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 27.
92. The formalist approach defines a term, here "parent,"
with reference to formal relationships, usually dictated by a
legal device such as marriage or formal adoption. Corre-
spondingly, the functionalist approach defines the term with
reference to the functions or attributes or "realities" opera-
tive in the relationships. These disparate views have also
been labeled conservative and liberal, respectively, but I pre-
fer the more neutral terminology of formalist and functional-
ist.
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fied by Alison D., decided in 1991 by the New
York Court of Appeals, which rejected the les-
bian co-parent's claim to visitation based upon
her de facto parent status. 93 The Court con-
cluded that the petitioner had no "standing" to
bring an action for visitation.94 In its brief per
curium opinion, New York's highest court re-
jected the claim "de facto parenthood" as insuf-
ficient to overcome the legal definition of par-
ent.95 Describing the issue as whether "a
biological stranger to a child who is properly in
the custody of his biological mother has stand-
ing to seek visitation with the child," the court
easily concluded that although Alison D. "ap-
parently nurtured a close and loving relation-
ship with the child, she is not a parent" within
the meaning of the statute. 96 Only the sole dis-
senting judge, the highly regarded feminist ju-
rist Judith Kaye, gave credence to a functional-
ist approach supported by empirical findings: in
the first paragraph of her opinion she referred
to estimates that "more than 15.5 million chil-
dren do not live with two biological parents,
and that as many as 8 to 10 million children are
born into families with a gay or lesbian par-
ent."97 Although not the first case to consider
the issue or reach this conclusion, Alison D.
demonstrates the paradigmatic formalist ap-
proach. Under its formalist perspective, "par-
ent" is conclusively defined by the formal legal
definition, resting upon biology or adoption.
The opposite perspective is the functional-
ist approach complete with a fact based test,
enunciated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
In re H.S.K.-H., also known as Holtzman v.
Knott.98 The Wisconsin court concluded that the
state visitation statute was not the sole means
for a court to entertain a visitation petition and
the courts had "long recognized equitable
power to protect the best interest of the
child." 99 In its ruling, the court first held that




96. Id. at 28 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §70 (McKinney
1999)).
97. Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
98. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wisc. 1995).
99. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court nevertheless struggled with its previous decisions de-
nying nonlegal parents standing. See e.g., In re ZJH, 471
N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (standing was denied to nonlegal
mother although she and the legal, non-biological mother
there must be a "parent-like" relationship be-
tween any petitioner and the child, which must
be proved by meeting four elements:
1. the legal parent fostered and con-
sented to development of a par-
ent-like relationship between the
petitioner and the child
2. the petitioner and child lived to-
gether in the same household
3. the petitioner assumed the obliga-
tions of parenthood by taking re-
sponsibility for the child's care, ed-
ucation, and development, includ-
ing but not limited to financial
contribution, and did not expect fi-
nancial compensation
4. the petitioner has been in a par-
ent-like relationship a sufficient
amount of time to have a bonded
relationship.1"'
In addition to these elements, there must
be a "trigger" to allow the state to intervene.
Namely, there must be a showing that the legal
parent has interfered with the relationship be-
tween the petitioner and the child, and the peti-
tioner must bring the action within a reasonable
time. 0''
In keeping with the formalist perspective
employed in Alison D., courts have denied"standing" to lesbians seeking visitation. For ex-
ample, a Tennessee appellate court considered
two consolidated cases each involving petitions
for visitation by women the court describes as"nonparents" who "previously maintained
same-sex relationships" with the child's biologi-
cal mother and who "provided care and sup-
port" to the child.0 2 The court began its analy-
sis with statutory definitions of "parent" which
include a child's biological mother and the man
married to the biological mother, and in the
had made the decision to adopt together and both lived with
and cared for the child together). The Hotlzman court largely
distinguished Z.J.H. based on issues of not raised in Holtz-
man. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 432-33. However, it ulti-
mately concluded that upon "re-examination of Z.J.H...."public policy considerations do not prohibit a court from re-
lying on its equitable powers to grant visitation" and over-
ruled "any language in Z.J.H. to the contrary." Id. at 433.
100. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421, 435-36.
101., Id.
102. White v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 914-15 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999).
adoption context, a step-parent.' °3 The court
then summarily concluded that neither woman
was "a parent as is contemplated by our legisla-
ture, despite each parties' characterizations
whereby each refers to herself as a 'parent' of
the child.' 1 4 The court continued that while "it
may be true that in our society the term 'parent'
has become used at times to describe more
loosely a person who shares mutual love and af-
fection with a child and who supplies care and
support to the child" it would be "inappropriate
to legislate judicially such a broad definition of
the term 'parent' as relating to legal rights relat-
ing to child custody and/or visitation.' 0 5
The Thompson court did note, however,
that the functionalist approach articulated in
Holtzman has been accepted by other courts. 10 6
For example, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts in E.N.O. v. L.M.M. recognized a lesbian
co-parent as a "de facto" parent and allowed
visitation.'0 7 While not specifically adopting the
Wisconsin court's formulation in Holtzman, the
Massachusetts court's articulation is strikingly
similar. Relying on Massachusetts common law
and American Law Institute Principles, the
court defined a de facto parent as one who "re-
sides with the child and, with the consent and
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a
share of caretaking functions at least as great as
the legal parent."' ' The court further noted
that the "de facto parent shapes the child's daily
routine, addresses his developmental needs, dis-
ciplines the child, provides for his education
and medical care, and serves as a moral guide"
and fulfills this role "for reasons primarily other
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than financial compensation."' 0' 9 This formula-
tion meets the first three criteria enunciated in
Holtzman" ° and implicitly includes the require-
ment that the parent-child relationship be of
reasonable duration.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court's deci-
sion in E.N. 0. was a significant turning point as
only the fourth time a state supreme court ex-
plicitly considered the issue."' It was an espe-
cially important case because it shifted the bal-
ance between the competing perspectives of
Wisconsin's Holtzman and New York's Alison
D. One issue was the availability of second par-
ent adoptions in Massachusetts112 a fact that has
had special consequences for visitation claims
of nonlegal parents in other jurisdictions that
have allowed second parent adoption.'13
The relationship between second parent
adoption and nonlegal parent's standing to seek
visitation has also been broached by the Ver-
mont Supreme Court in Titchenal v. Dexter.1 4
Although not mentioning the Wisconsin and
New York cases, the Vermont court found it rel-
evant to note that when the child in Titchenal
was "only five months old, at least one Vermont
probate court had allowed the female partner of
a child's adoptive mother to adopt the child as a
second parent" and that it was "more than a
year" before the parties' relationship had en-
ded." 5 The Vermont Supreme Court itself had
previously permitted "a biological mother's fe-
male partner to adopt the mother's child with-
out the mother having to terminate her parental
103. Id. at 918 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §36-1-102(26)
(1996)). In light of the definition that a man becomes a par-
ent by marriage to the biological mother, the court found it"relevant to note" that Tennessee specifically prohibits same-
sex marriage by providing that marriage between one man
and one woman is the only legally recognized marital con-
tract. Id. at 918 n.2 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §36-3-113
(1996)).
104. Id. at 918.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 920 n.8.
107. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 982 (Mass.
1999).
108. Id. at 891 (citing Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165,
167 n.3 (Mass. 1999) (citing ALl principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution § 2.03 (1)(b) (May, 1998))). See also Julie
Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the
New ALl Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999).
109. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891(citations omitted).
110. See Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421, 435-36
(Wisc. 1995).
111. Alison D. was decided in New York in 1991, Holtz-
man v. Knott in Wisconsin, 1995, and Jones v. Fowler, in
Texas, 1998.
112. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass.
1993).
113. Compare Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27
(N.Y. 1991) with In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (In
New York, the availability of second parent adoptions has
precluded nonlegal parent visitation claims). See also id. at
409 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (noting that at the time Alison
D. was decided, New York had not settled the issue of the
availability of second parent adoptions to lesbian co-parents,
and therefore availability must not be assumed for the pur-
poses of this decision). But compare Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d
419, with In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678
(Wis. 1994) (availability of second parent adoption is evi-
dence of policy favoring flexibility, and supports allowance of
visitation to nonlegal parents).
114. Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 686-87.
115. Id.
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rights.' ' 116 The Vermont court declined to ex-
tend any equitable theories in light of the par-
ties' failure to pursue existing legal remedies," 7
unlike the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
E.N.O., which used its previous decision al-
lowing second-parent adoptions to bolster its
conclusion that the best interests of the child
must include consideration of the child's rela-
tionship with both legal and de facto parents) 18
With E.N. 0., the Massachusetts Supreme Court
undercut one of the dominant rationales for de-
nying nonlegal parent visitation and evenly split
the conclusions among those states whose high-
est courts had considered the issue.
C. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision
in V.C. v. M.J.B.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in V.C. v.
M.J.B.119 entered into this equally divided terri-
tory and in a unanimous opinion clearly tipped
the balance toward allowing nonlegal parent visi-
tation, as enunciated in Holtzman, and away
from the formalism of Alison D.120 While
agreeing with the Massachusetts court in
E.N.O., the New Jersey court was much more
explicit in its adoption of the Holtzman criteria,
stating that the "most thoughtful and inclusive
definition of de facto parenthood is the test
enunciated in Custody of H.S.H.-K' 1 2 ' and that
it was "satisfied that the test provides a good
framework for determining psychological
parenthood in cases where the third party has
lived for a substantial period with the legal par-
ent and her child.' 122
Elaborating on the test, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court devoted most of its analysis to the
first prong, which requires the legal parent to
have fostered and consented to development of
a parent-like relationship between the nonlegal
parent and the child. The court found this re-
quirement "critical" because it makes the legal
parent "a participant in the creation of the psy-
chological parent's relationship with the
child." '23 The requirement of consent pre-
cluded the possibility that a "paid nanny or ba-
bysitter" could qualify as a person seeking visi-
124tation, a contingency that appears trouble-
some, if remote.125 Such results are also ade-
quately protected against by the test's third
qualification, which specifically provides that
the nonlegal parent did not expect remunera-
tion.126 The court in V. C. used the consent re-
quirement as a springboard to stressthat the le-
gal parent retains firm control because she has
the "absolute ability to maintain a zone of au-
tonomous privacy for herself and her child.' 127
M.J.B. had argued that, as the legal parent, she
has the fundamental right to the care, custody,
and control of her children.128 The court agreed
that this right is grounded in the constitution
and "deeply imbedded in our collective con-
sciousness and traditions," and generally deriv-
ing from the notion of privacy.1 29 But the Court
then quickly added that such a right is not abso-
lute and could be limited by the state if the par-
ent endangers the health or safety of the
child 3 ° or if there is some showing of unfitness,
abandonment or gross conduct. 3' The court re-
116. Id. (citing In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272, 1274
n.3 (Vt. 1993)).
117. Id. at 687.
118. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
119. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
120. Soon after this decision, the contrary decision in Ver-
mont was nullified by the Vermont Legislature, through a
"Civil Union" statute. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §1204 (f)
(1999). See also discussion supra note 90.
121. VC., 748 A.2d at 551 (citing Holtzman v. Knott, 533
N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wisc. 1995)).
122. V.C., 748 A.2d at 551-52.
123. Id. at 552.
124. Id. "[The] legal parent must have fostered the formu-
lation of the parental relationship between the third party
and the child" and further clarifies "fostered" to mean that
the legal parent ceded "a measure of parental authority and
autonomy" and allowed the "third party rights and duties vis-
a-vis the child that the third party's status would not other-
wise warrant." Id. The court then concluded that "ordinarily,
a relationship based upon payment by the legal parent to the
third party will not qualify." Id.
125. M.J.B. had characterized V.C. as a "mere helper."
748 A.2d at 543. There has been no reported case in which a
custody or visitation action was brought by a person who
could be accurately described as a babysitter, nanny, or au
pair, although this concern has been voiced by courts before.
See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 n.6 ("we do not recog-
nize as a de facto parent a babysitter or other paid caretaker.
Even though these caretakers may grow to feel genuine af-
fection for their charges, their caretaking arrangements arose
for financial reasons").
126. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 435-36.
127. V.C., 748 A.2d at 552.
128. Id. at 548.
129. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (citing
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring)).
130. V.C., 748 A.2d at 548 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 233- 34(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166-67 (1944)).
131. V.C., 748 A.2d 548-49 (citations omitted).
jected M.J.B.'s claim that because there was no
allegation of unfitness the court could not inter-
fere. a32 This position implicitly limits the doc-
trine which allows a third party to seek custody
or visitation only under "exceptional circum-
stances" with an exception for the "health and
safety" of the child. "The 'exceptional circum-
stances' category contemplates the intervention
of the Court in the exercise of its parens patriae
power to protect a child.' 133
The New Jersey Supreme Court could not
have been unmindful of the United States Su-
preme Court's pending decision in Troxel,134
which had been argued before the Court in Jan-
uary and had attracted much attention.135 Given
the possibility that the United States Supreme
Court would affirm the Washington court's
broad invocation of parental autonomy rights to
declare the state's visitation statute unconstitu-
tional, 36 the New Jersey Supreme Court in V. C.
was justifiably concerned with whether granting
the nonlegal parent visitation rights would in-
fringe upon the parental autonomy of the legal
parent. 13 The ready solution is the first require-
ment in the Holtzman court's formulation of"consent.' 38 As explained by the court in V. C.,
the legal mother can choose to maintain her"zone of autonomous privacy," but once she
abandons it and a "profound bond" between
the nonlegal parent and child develops, that
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bond may not then be "unilaterally terminated"
by the legal parent.'39
The court in V. C. was careful not to equate
the consent requirement with intentionality. 4 '
Intentional parenting is a notion that has gained
limited scholarly support.14 ' According to the
New Jersey Supreme Court, the trial court over-
emphasized the relevance of the parties' pre-
birth intentions. 42 The court in V. C. held that,
while "joint participation in the family's deci-
sion to have a child is probative evidence of the
legally recognized parent's intentions,' 43 not
having participated in the decision does not pre-
clude a nonlegal parent from being a psycholog-
ical parent.144
The court in V.C. was considerably less at-
tentive to the other prongs of the Holtzman
test, but did emphasize that the third require-
ment, that the nonlegal parent assume the obli-
gations of parenthood, is not dependent on fi-
nancial support.145 While there was apparently
no dispute that V.C. did contribute financially
to the children, 46 the court cautioned that fi-
nancial consideration should not be given "inor-
dinate weight.' 47 A "stay-at-home" parent who"undertakes all of the daily domestic and child
care activities in a household with preschool
children while the legal parent is the breadwin-
132. Id. at 549.
133. Id.
134. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
135. The pendency of the case was widely discussed in the
national news and popular media; see, e.g., Adam Cohen,
Whose Child is This? How the Laws are Changing, TIME, Jan.
17, 2000, at 68; Amy Dickinson, The Right to Visit: After Par-
ents Divorce, What Legal Claim Do Grandparents Have to
See their Grandkids? TIME, Jan. 1, 2000, at 112; Joseph Sha-
piro, The Right to be a Relative: Grandparents Sue for Visita-
tion and the Courts are Left to Define 'Family', U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jan. 17, 2000, at 46; as well as national law
sources. See Marcia Coyle, Do Parents Rights Take Prece-
dence? Court Must Thrash Through Issue After Years of Neg-
lect, THE NAT'L. L. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at Al.
136. The Washington Supreme Court held that because
the statute did not require a showing of harm to the child, the
visitation statute was an unconstitutional infringement of the
parent's due process rights. Troxel v. Granville, 969 P.2d 2,
21, 31 (Wash. 1999).




141. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduc-
tion: Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-Child Bond,
26 CONN. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1994) (describing the "intent"
standard as "deceptively simple... remarkably ill chosen, and
remarkably ill-defined."); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Repro-
ductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An Oppor-
tunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 322-23
(advocating intent as the "determining factor" in establishing
parenthood, but only in cases of "artificial or assisted repro-
duction").
142. V.C., 748 A.2d at 552-53 ("The trial court appeared to
view the fact that M.J.B. alone made the decision to have the
twins as pivotal to the question of the existence of a psycho-
logical parent relationship between V.C. and the children").
143. Id. at 553.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. After the twins were born, V.C. and M.J.B. had joint
bank accounts for household expenses and savings accounts
for the children with one adult named as the custodian for
each. Id. at 542. After the women separated, V.C. contrib-
uted money for the children. Id. at 544. V.C. had taken
three weeks vacation time from work after the twins were
born. V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999), affd, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). According to
Judge Wecker of the Appellate Division, "the evidence was
undisputed that V.C. undertook the financial responsibilities
of a parent to these children." 725 A.2d at 27 (Wexler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000).
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ner" could qualify as a psychological parent."'
The court noted that although the contributions
of the stay at home parent could be monetarily
measured,149 such economic valuation was not
the point. It "is the nature of what is done that
will determine whether a parent-child bond has
developed, not how much it is worth in dol-
lars. 150
The existence of the parent-child bond is
the primary focus of New Jersey's adoption of
the Holtzman test.1 5 ' It is this bond that the
parent, once she has fostered it, cannot unilater-
ally sunder. It requires time to develop, but the
amount of time needed is unique in each situa-
tion.152 The existence of this bond and its "actu-
ality and strength," will generally need to be
proven by expert testimony.'53
Once that bond has been established and
the nonlegal parent has met the criteria for be-
ing a psychological parent, she stands in parity
with the legal parent, so that custody and visita-
tion will be determined under the best interest
of the child standard. But this parity is under-
mined by the court's acknowledgment that a
person's status as legal parent "plays a part" in
the custody or visitation proceedings:
The legal parent's status is a significant
weight in the best interests balance be-
cause eventually, in the search for self-
knowledge, the child's interest in his
or her roots will emerge. Thus, under
ordinary circumstances when the evi-
dence concerning the child's best in-
terests (as between a legal parent and
psychological parent) is in equipoise,
custody will be awarded to the legal
parent.'54
Thus, with regard to custody, the psychological
parent and the legal parent are both equally en-
titled to be considered in the "best interest"
analysis, but the legal parent will have some
substantive advantage because the legal status
itself will be a factor considered. 5 5 Visitation,
however, becomes "presumptive" once the non-
legal parent is deemed a psychological par-
ent.156
The dissonance between custody and visi-
tation applications is apparent as exercised with
reference to V.C. The New Jersey Supreme
Court found that the legal mother, M.J.B., was
a "fully capable, loving parent, committed to
the safety and welfare of the twins.' ' 157 That the
same characterization is accorded to V.C., how-
ever, renders her not quite as equal despite the
court's statement in this paragraph that the wo-
men are "essentially equal.' 58 While noting
that V.C. is seeking legal custody (decision-
making) rather than physical custody, the court
finds it important that V.C. has not been in-
volved in the decision-making process for the
children for nearly four years "due to the pen-
dency of this case" and thus to "interject her
into the decisional realm at this point would be
unnecessarily disruptive for all involved.' 159
While denying custody, the court finds visita-
tion "another matter," based in part at least on
the fact that V.C. regularly visited the children
"during nearly all of the four years since V.C.
parted company from M.J.B."' 6 ° The court
notes that "continued visitation" is presumed,
yet given its earlier pronouncement that visita-
tion in general is presumptive, the entitlement
of a psychological parent to visitation remains a
bit unclear.
Nevertheless, there is no ambiguity as to
the New Jersey Supreme Court's position opin-
ion regarding psychological parenthood:
Third parties who live in familial cir-
cumstances with a child and his or her
legal parent may achieve, with the
consent of the legal parent, a psycho-
logical parent status vis-a-vis a child.
Fundamental to a finding of the exis-
tence of that status is that a parent-
child bond has been created. That
bond cannot be unilaterally termi-
nated by the legal parent. When there
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Mar-
riage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Pre-
marital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L.REv. 17, 43 (1998)).
150. V.C., 748 A.2d at 553.
151. Id. ("[T]he fourth prong is most important because it
requires the existence of a parent-child bond").
152. Id. ('How much time is necessary will depend upon
the facts of each case including an assessment of exactly what
functions the putative parent performed, as well as at what
period and stage of the child's life and development such ac-
tions were taken.")
153. Id.
154. Id. at 554.
155. See id.
156. Id.




is a conflict over custody and visitation
between the legal parent and a psy-
chological parent, the legal paradigm
is that of two legal parents and the
standard to be applied is the best in-
terests of the child.
Establishing psychological par-
enthood is not an easy task and the
standards we have adopted should be
scrupulously applied in order to pro-
tect the legal parent-child relation-
ship.161
The New Jersey Supreme Court has undoubt-
edly adopted a functional approach to defining
parenthood and given legal status to those
deemed to be psychological parents.
D. Beyond Functionalism
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in V.C. v. M.J.B. will most likely be lauded by
lesbian and gay advocates as a recognition of"our families." Considering the alternative-
the absolute denial of any status to a lesbian co-
parent-such acclaim is merited. Nevertheless,
the functionalist approach as articulated in
V.C., E.L.O., and Holtzman has some serious
problems which could work to the detriment of
lesbian parents in future litigation. The func-
tional approach serves to "construct" the ways
in which lesbian mothering occurs and is recog-
nized. Thus, the judiciary is constructing lesbian
mothers by deciding who qualifies as a "de
facto" mother and who does not. This type of
judicial conclusion can be determinative. For in-
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stance, a nonlegal mother denied access to her
child has little, if any, opportunity to be a"mother in fact." While it offers significant ben-
efits, the functionalist approach raises two ma-
jor concerns, discussed in turn as the problems
of "domestication" and "inequality". 162
1) Domestication
The problem with the functionalist ap-
proach is that it enshrines a very conservative
and stereotyped view of parenting.1 63 Although
purportedly based on "reality," its view of real-
ity is unduly static. Any aspirations that lesbians
can revolutionize - or even reform - the
norms of motherhood are thwarted by function-
alist definitions, which tend to exclude from le-
gal recognition precisely those relationships
which might "revolutionize" motherhood.1 64 As
feminist legal theoretician Martha Minow
(while discussing her work on Alison D.'s at-
tempt to prove her de facto parenthood) de-
scribes the functionalist approach "people
should be able to choose to enter family rela-
tionships, but not be free to rewrite the terms of
those relationships., 165 For example, what the
child calls the adults in her life played a surpris-
ingly significant role in the many of the courts'
analyses. In a number of cases allowing the non-
legal mother standing to petition for visitation,
the court deems a mom-like word notewor-
thy.16 6 In the absence of a mom-like term, the
court seems open to another familial-type des-
ignation: the child "knew Appellee as 'Aunt
161. Id.
162. There is some concern about the implications of the
emphasis placed by the V.C. court on the legal mother's in-
tent to foster the other parent's relationship with the child.
See V.C., 748 A.2d at 555. By focusing on intent, the court
may be veering close to a contract-based analysis, which
makes the child the object of the contract between the adults.
Such thinking has been roundly criticized from a feminist
perspective. See generally Williams, supra note 74; Radin,
supra note 74.
In the lesbian and gay context, Sidney Callahan has de-
clared that any child conceived by third party collaboration
becomes a "made to order product of the parent's will and
desire to reproduce" and that such children are less than
equal in the family because they exist under the pressure of
being "optimal babies." Sidney Callahan, Gays, Lesbians,
and the Use of Alternate Reproductive Technologies, in FEMI-
NISM AND FAMILIES 188, 199 (Hilde Lindemann Nelson ed.,
1997). Furthermore, the "intent to foster" requirement im-
plicitly operates to counter any argument that the legal
mother might raise regarding her constitutional substantive
due process rights. By "fostering" the relationship, the legal
mother can less persuasively argue that the state (in the form
of the judicial process) is interfering with her rights to "care,
custody, and control" of her child. It is a troubling possibility
that one might forever foreclose the exercise of one's consti-
tutional substantive due process rights without a knowing,
voluntary, intelligent, and explicit waiver.
163. For example, it is still focused on the relationship be-
tween the adults as definitive in the parent-child relationship.
164. Parenthood is defined by a factual model, which
looks very much like a heterosexual stepparent arrangement,
rather than by the putative parent and her child.
165. Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and
Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 282 (1991).
166. Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840,
841 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) ("the child referred to the plain-
tiff as 'mommy'"); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889 ("the child calls
the plaintiff 'Mommy' and the defendant 'Mama"'); See In
Re J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S. 2d 295, 296 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000)
("the children refer to petitioner as 'Moma'"); Gestl v. Fred-
erick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (the child
called appellant "'Mim', a derivative of mom"); V.C., 748
A.2d at 542 ("the children call M.J.B. 'Mommy' and V.C.
'Meema."').
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[T.].' 1 67 The "child called Holtzman 'My San,'
and each year on Father's Day Holtzman,
Knott, and the child celebrated their own spe-
cial holiday honoring Holtzman.', 168
One wonders in these cases how a court
might interpret a situation in which the child
called the adults in her or his life by their first
names because the adults believed that titles
such as father, mother, or "mommy" created
unearned hierarchies. Arguably, the child's
term for the adults, especially if used for both
adults, should be insignificant because it does
not specifically relate to any of the criteria es-
tablishing de facto parenthood.
A judicial construction of lesbian relation-
ships (declaring some cognizable and excluding
others) is subject to lesbian critique. As I have
argued in other contexts, such an approach "do-
mesticates" lesbian relationships and lesbian ex-
istence.169 Similarly, from a "queer" perspec-
tive, Darren Rosenblum has argued that even
recent "victories" of the gay and lesbian legal
reform movement fail to account for "queer in-
tersectionality," by discounting people he de-
nominates as "poor queers," "queers of color,""sexual subversives" and "gender subver-
sives.' 170 New York's second parent adoption
case 17 is among those that Rosenblum thinks
have failed to account for "queer intersectional-
ity".'7 I have similarly concluded that second-
parent adoption jurisprudence is problematic
from a class perspective. 173 Likewise, Erin Law
identifies the class privilege in second-parent
adoptions,' 74 and further argues that the legal
process is invasive and ultimately privileges the
birth mother over the nonbirth mother. 175
In her seminal critique of second parent
adoption jurisprudence, Professor Julie Shapiro
contends that second-parent adoptions divide
the lesbian community in at least two ways. 176
First, they divide by benefiting only some lesbi-
ans. The second-parent adoption process does
not help a lesbian who is raising children born
to her partner's prior heterosexual relationship,"where the father remains a Iegal parent. 1177
Secondly, Shapiro argues that second-parent
adoptions divide lesbians into classes by in-
come, histories of substance abuse, criminal
records, or lifestyles; rendering some lesbians
less attractive candidates for judicially con-
ferred motherhood than others.178
Thus, according to Shapiro, the availability
of second parent adoption may work to the det-
riment of some lesbians because once the needs
of the "most politically powerful members of
the lesbian community" are met, these women
will consider the issue resolved and "turn to
other issues" despite the fact that some women
remain excluded.' 79 Shapiro also extends the
concept of the "but-for" lesbian (that is, a les-
bian whose socio-economic status makes her ac-
ceptable, but-for her lesbianism) 80 to lesbian
families and argues that second-parent adop-
tions "validate 'but for' lesbian families rein-
forcing traditional models and further marginal-
izing others.181 Shapiro further contends that
the very existence of an available legal remedy
such as second-parent adoption may undermine
other legal claims.' 82
In addition, Shapiro contends that it is not
only the existence of lesbian second parent
adoptions but lesbians' "uncritical acceptance"
of such legal devices, that works to domesticate
lesbian existence.' 83 Shapiro outlines three as-
pects of this domestication. First, domestication
is a response to is powerful incentives to "mold
167. T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 873 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000)
168. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Wisc. 1995).
169. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW: SuR-
VIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 119-27 (1992).
170. Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the
Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEX-
UALiTY 83 (1994).
171. In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1992), and discusses
the attention paid to the economic status of the adoptive
mothers.
172. See Rosenblum, supra note 170, at 104.
173. See ROBSON, supra note 17, at 185-87.
174. See Erin Law, Taking a Critical Look at Second-Par-
ent Adoptions, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 699 (1998).
175. Id.
176. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 30.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 31.
179. Id.
180. See ROBSON, supra note 17, at 30, 107; Rosenblum,
supra note 170, at 93 (employing concept of "but for
queers").
181. Shapiro, supra note 18 at 32.
182. Id. at 31-33. Shapiro discusses the Vermont Supreme
Court's refusal in Titchenal, to reach the issue of equitable
parenthood because of the existence of legal second-parent
adoptions, as an example of the dangers of "remedies" like
second parent adoptions working to the concrete detriment
of a specific lesbian. Id. at 33-35.
183. Id. at 35.
oneself to fit the 'good lesbian' model" and to"walk, talk, and act like heterosexual parents"
conforming to the nuclear family model.18 4 Sec-
ond, the possibility of second parent adoptions
serves to internalize beliefs that a "real" mother
is a legal mother and that nonlegal mothers are
not "real" mothers. Lastly, and for Shapiro"perhaps most fundamentally," second parent
adoptions domesticate because they "foster the
belief that the law will protect rather than con-
strain lesbians., 185
Shapiro's analysis of lesbian-second parent
adoptions is transferable to lesbian functional
parenting doctrine. Like second-parent adop-
tions, functional definitions of parenting divide
us because by design such definitions benefit
only some lesbian nonlegal mothers. Function-
alism in the form of de facto, psychological, or
equitable parenting theories, like second parent
adoption, will not be available to lesbians rais-
ing children in situations where there is a legal
father,186 no matter what functions the lesbian
nonlegal mother performs or whether the legal
father performs any functions. As Shapiro con-
tends in the second-parent adoption context,
this division could serve to divide lesbians into"real" lesbian mothers whose children are not
from previous heterosexual relationships and
"those other lesbians" whose status as women
raising children is diminished.'87
Shapiro's argument that there are divisions
even among the lesbians for whom second-par-
ent adoption is devised 88 can also be applied to
functional parenthood. The differences in in-
come, histories of substance abuse, criminal
records, or "lifestyle" which might render a par-
ticular lesbian an unattractive candidate for ju-
dicially conferred motherhood in the context of
184. Id.
185. Id. at 36.
186. Id. at 30.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 31-36.
189. See id. at 32.
190. See id. at 31-33. For instance, a court may reject a
second-parent adoption petition or procedurally bar the ac-
tion through time limits. See Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429
(Tex. 1998).
191. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000).
192. See, e.g., Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d at 840, 841 (not-
ing that the women "were in a committed lesbian relation-
ship for approximately ten years"); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 888
(they "shared a committed, monogamous relationship for
thirteen years"); T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) ("they had an exclusive relationship").
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a second-parent adoption will likewise render
her an unattractive candidate for judicially con-
ferred psychological parent status. 189 The very
existence of an available legal remedy such as
psychological parent status may undermine
other legal claims.' 90
The New Jersey Supreme Court's instruc-
tion that parental-child bonding will generally
be proven through expert testimony 9' should
alert lesbians about whom the law is empower-
ing to structure their families. The Court's
adoption of substantive criteria for determining
parenthood should alert lesbians about what is
being dictated as the proper way to structure
their families. For instance, the functional
parenthood recognized by the Court is the het-
erosexual dyadic model. To qualify as parents,
the lesbian adults must be a couple (not a trio
or quartet), they must live together and they
must be monogamous. The overemphasis on
the relationship between the adults is itself
troubling, given that the material issue is one of
parent-child bonding.
When recognizing lesbians as parents,
courts do not hesitate to characterize them in a
way that mirrors heterosexual couples. Among
factors that courts have found relevant are that
their relationship was lengthy, committed, ex-
clusive, and socially memorialized.' 92 The com-
mitment of the women to each other is often
measured economically, including consideration
of their financial relationship before any child is
present.'93 While such arrangements may be
pertinent in that they show "financial prepara-
tions" for having a child,'94 such facts really
demonstrate no more than that the adults have
a spouse-like relationship, a fact whose rele-
vance to child custody or visitation is contingent
In V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d at 15 the court noted that par-
ties took part in a "commitment ceremony" and that the chil-
dren were present at the ceremony. The parties to Barnae,
943 P.2d at 1038, also observed a ceremony to memorialize
their union Id. at 1038. The court stated that whether the cer-
emony was an occasion to enter a binding contract was in
dispute, thus making the recitation of the ceremony arguably
relevant. The court did not, however, explicitly stated it did
not reach the merits of the case; see id. at 1040.
193. See, e.g., Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d at 841 (the par-
ties purchased home together two years before the child was
born); TB., 753 A. 2d at 877 (the parties purchased a home"soon" after the parties moving in together and well before
the child was born).
194. See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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on the assumption that conventional, marriage-
like family formation is central to parenting.
This spouse-like relation that limits the wo-
men to a dyadic couple seems to be the stan-
dard, although in one case, a court honored an
agreement among the parties and granted pa-
rental rights to three parties (biological legal
mother, the non-biological legal mother by sec-
ond parent adoption, and the sperm donor/bio-
logical father).,95 Even this court, however, sub-
sequently rejected the argument that this was a
"'triumvirate' parenting scheme" based upon
the fact that the father's rights were less than
those of the mothers, who had joint legal cus-
tody.196 The court thus implicitly agreed that a
child can only have two legal parents, even if in
fact there are two biological parents and one
psychological parent. If a court were to con-
front a situation where a legal mother lived in a
household with two other adults (lovers or oth-
erwise), both of whom acted as psychological
parent to the child, it is doubtful that a court
would declare both nonlegal mothers to be psy-
chological parents, or grant both of them paren-
tal rights.' 97
Lastly, Shapiro's fundamental argument
that second parent adoptions domesticate lesbi-
ans because they "foster the belief that the law
will protect rather than constrain lesbians 198
correlates to the reality that the availability of
litigation to solve the problem of access to a
child forestalls other avenues. While there have
been some attempts to forge a consensus that
litigation may not be the solution, 99 for the
most part the efforts of our communities are de-
voted to legal remedies and reforms rather than
the development of ideas and methodologies
which might prevent lesbians from suing each
other in court. Thus, while the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's decision in V.C. v. M.J.B. is a
mark of progress for lesbian legal reform, the
reform is applicable to only some lesbians and
has the potential to domesticate all lesbians.
2) Equality
The other shortcoming of functionalism for
lesbian parents is that it is clearly "separate but
not equal." Functionalist standards are not im-
posed on persons the law deems parents be-
cause of biology. A man may be declared a fa-
ther based upon a biological paternity test
despite the fact that he never intended to be a
parent, the legal mother never possessed any in-
tent to foster a parent-like relationship, he
never lived in the same household with the
child, never assumed responsibility for the
child, and had never been with the child for any
significant amount of time. Compare, for exam-
ple, the evidence and expert testimony neces-
sary to deem V.C. a psychological parent, which
simply was not required of a biological father in
another case, who won custody of a child with
whom he had an irregular relationship at
best.2 °° There was virtually nothing in that case
to suggest that the father bonded with the child,
or took financial or other responsibility for the
child. Neither was there any evidence the bio-
logical mother (now deceased) had intended
him to act as a parent. His mere biological rela-
tion to the child sufficed for a court to declare
him a "parent" with not only a claim to custody
and visitation, but a presumption in his favor.2° '
Further, not only is there inequality relat-
ing to the levels of proof for a person to be
deemed a parent, but this inequality persists in
the implementation of the standards. According
to the V.C. court, the legal parent possesses a
preference by virtue of biological connection20 2
195. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151,161 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000). Interestingly, despite the fact that the court
notes that the women's petition for adoption was granted, id
at 157, the court analyzes the nonbiological mother's claim as
that of a "non-parent," concluding that she has standing to
seek custody under the Minnesota statute. Id. at 158-59.
196. LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 161.
197. While I do not necessarily advocate multiple parents,
it is of considerable concern to those who envision non-tradi-
tional families that the not only the law of formalism, but
also the law of functionalism is structured in ways that would
deny them the right to form their kind of families.
198. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 36.
199. See Shapiro, supra note 18, at 36. (discussing Gay and
Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Protecting Families: Stan-
dards for Child Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10
UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 151 (1999)).
200. See Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 575, 577 (N.J.
2000) (Stein, J., dissenting).
201. Initially, the biological father was not awarded cus-
tody, because the lower courts found the child's maternal
grandparents to be psychological parents and awarded them
custody based on the child's best interest standard. See Wat-
kins v. Nelson, 729 A.2d 484, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999). The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered
immediate transfer of the child to her father's custody. Wat-
kins, 748 A.2d at 570.
202. V.C., 748 A.2d at 554-55.
despite the court's declaration that the legal and
psychological parents stand "in parity."' 3 The
consequences of legal status as opposed to non-
legal status are also demonstrated by the court's
conclusion in V. C. Despite the fact that V.C. is
recognized as a psychological parent, V.C. is
not awarded the legal custody that she sought
because she has been not been exercising deci-
sion-making during the four years the suit has
been pending.20 4 The court elides the fact that
M.J.B. has rested upon her legal status as recog-
nized mother to exclude V.C. from such a role.
Presumably, the justification for the court's de-
cision would be that the court is more con-
cerned with the "best interests of the child"
than with equality among the adults. Neverthe-
less, in a situation involving two legal parents, a
court might not be as willing to reward the par-
ent who had excluded the other.2"5 However
progressive the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in V. C. v. M.J.B. may be, it neverthe-
less continues to perpetuate a two-tiered system
of legal rights for parents. Lesbian nonlegal par-
ents must act as parents and must prove that
have they so acted, and even if they did, their"parity" with legal parents remains a "lesser"
parity.
CONCLUSION
Despite significant drawbacks, functionalist
definitions of the parent-child relationships
point to an improvement over strict formalist
applications which deny the realities of lesbian
203. Id. at 554.
204. Id. at 555.
205. Cf. Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981) (in consider-
ing custody in the context of divorce, the court stated that "in
promoting the child's welfare, the court should strain every
effort to attain for the child the affection of both parents
rather than one." (internal quotes and citations omitted)).
The court also noted that
parents involved in custody controversies have by stat-
ute been granted both equal rights and equal responsi-
bilities regarding the care, nurture, education and wel-
fare of their children. Although not an explicit
authorization of joint custody, this clearly related statute
indicates a legislative preference for custody decrees
that allow both parents full and genuine involvement in
the lives of their children following a divorce. This ap-
proach is consonant with the common law policy.
Id.
Indeed, the New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN §9:2-4,
provides not only that it is the policy of the state that minor
children have frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents and that the parents share the rights and responsibilities
of child rearing, but also that in making an award of custody,
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 22:15 2000]
parenting practices. Nevertheless, we must con-
tinue to be aware that functionalist definitions
are partial and to resist the temptation to be-
lieve that "any particular model" of lesbian life
embodies lesbian values.20 6 More importantly,
we must refuse to engage in sentimental politics
which merely focus on the awarding of parent-
child status to particular adults and children and
must further interrogate the specific rewards
and responsibilities that flow from such sta-
tus.20 7
Having begun with P.D. Eastman's, Are
You My Mother? I am now suggesting that we
now need to rephrase the question. Instead of''are you mother" or even "are you my
mothers?" our inquiries about non-lesbian legal
parents must have a deeper purpose. Rather
than P.D. Eastman or even the progressive jus-
tices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, we
might return to theorists in our own commu-
nity. On the subject of motherhood, Audre
Lorde, self-described "Black Lesbian Warrior
Poet," noted:
I believe that raising children is one
way of participating in the future, in
social change. On the other hand, it
would be dangerous as well as senti-
mental to think that childrearing alone
is enough to bring about a livable fu-
ture in the absence of any definition of
that future. For unless we develop
some coherent vision of that world in
which we hope these children will par-
ticipate, and some sense of our own
the court shall consider "the parents' willingness to accept
custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting
time not based on substantiated abuse."
The history of unwillingness to allow access to the child by
the other parent, sometimes dubbed the "friendly parent
rule," has been subject to criticism with regards to domestic
abuse situations in which the abused partner is penalized in
custody determinations for being "unfriendly" to the person
who had abused her. See e.g., Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of
Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1067 (1991) (ar-
guing that friendly parent rule should not be applied in cases
of domestic violence); Marlene Rapkin, The Impact of Do-
mestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 19 J. Juv. L.
404, 411 (1998).
206. V.C., 748 A.2d at 556 (Long, J., concurring) ("we
should not be misled into thinking that any particular model
of family life is the only one that embodies 'family values"').
207. For example, litigation between two lesbians might
solve the issue of which parent shall add the child to her em-
ployee benefit health insurance, but it fails to address ques-
tions of whether medical insurance should be a privilege of
corporate employment.
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responsibilities in shaping that world,
we will only raise new performers in
the master's sorry drama.2"8
In developing a "coherent vision" of a fu-
ture in which our children will not simply be"new performers in the master's sorry drama,"
we need to eschew individualized solutions that
rely on traditional versions of parenting,
whether the versions be formalist or functional.
As another Black Lesbian theorist, Barbara
Smith, formulates the real inquiry: "But how do
it free us?"2 °9
208. Audre Lorde, Turning the Beat Around: Lesbian
Parenting 1986, in A BURST OF LIGHT, 39, 40 (1988).
209. Barbara Smith, Doing It From Scratch: The Challenge
of Black Lesbian Organizing, in THIS Is WHAT A LESBIAN
LOOKS LIKE: DYKE ACTIviSTs TAKE ON THE 211T CENTURY
245, 250. (Kris Kleindiest, ed. 1999). Smith states that she is
adopting this question as originally posed by the poet and
activist Sonia Sanchez to assess "the revolutionary content of
ideas and actions." Id.

